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The Strange Tale of Wesley and Florence
Garrison: Racial Crosscurrents of the Postwar
Florida Republican Party
by Michael D. Bowen

F

or the first two thirds of the 20" Century, the Republican
Party of Florida had a well-deserved reputation for being
quiet, weak, and ineffectual. The Democratic Party dominated electoral politics so completely that some counties in the panhandle and north central Florida prided themselves on having nb
registered Republicans. Yet at the 1952 state Republican convention, held in the sleepy college town of Gainesville, the participants
acted as if their meeting mattered. A group of upstarts led by
Miami real estate developers Wesley and Florence Garrison, a couple some regarded as reformers and some regarded as rabblerousers, commandeered the fiont row of seating and refused to
allow the state executive committee to take their positions on
stage. After the Alachua County sheriff restored order, the
Garrisons and their supporters made their presence known by
repeatedly interrupting the opening roll call with chants of "contest" and "communist," and slamming their chair legs loudly
against the tile floor. At issue was the party's decision to abandon
the primary election and select its delegates to the Republican
gational convention without participation from rank and file party
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members, a choice the Garrisons vehemently opposed. Despite the
repeated distractions, however, the state party went on with its
agenda and appointed a delegate slate that excluded the Gamsons
and their allies.
The 1952 convention was just one incident in the strange tale of
Wesley and Florence Garrison and was the midpoint in a decade-long
struggle pitting the Garrisons and their south Florida supporters
against the established Republican leadership. The Garrisons are
rarely discussed in Florida history, but their checkered political
careers reveal three specific trends that illustrate the fluctuating
nature of postwar America's political and demographic landscape.
First, the couple confronted the changing racial dynamic. The
Garrisons, who were white, based their partybuilding efforts in
Miami's African-American community at a time when both parties
were struggling to cope with an emerging civil rights consciousness.
This placed the Ganisons at the forefront of local activism and put
them on a collision course with the racially exclusionist practices of
the Florida Republican Party. Second, the Garrisons operated at a
time when migration from the North was applying pressure to the
traditionally Democratic and rural political institutions of the
Sunshine State. Their grassroots mobilization of the AfricanAmerican community was part of a broader struggle to expand the
Florida GOP beyond its limited base and unseat its narrowly focused
and uninterested leadership. Third, The Garrisons took sides in a factional dispute between candidates at the national level in which two
organizations engaged in heated contests for their party's presidential nomination and, in the process, became embroiled in numerous
state and local matters. The Garrisons framed their own local battles
as part of this larger factional struggle and, at times, played significant roles in the national party. From 1944 through 1956, these
three issues combined to dictate the fate of the Republican Party in
Florida. The Garrisons' actions reveal much about the complex and
often interconnected political networks that shaped Florida, the
South,and the nation, as well as the racial tension that permeated all
aspects of American politics in the postwar period.
Florence and Wesley Garrison moved to Florida from the
Midwest in the early 1930s and began organizing for the
Republican Party shortly thereafter, probably around 1934.' The
1.

Very little is known about Florence and Wesley Garrison's background and
early lie. Though the couple made their mark on Miami's African-American
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Garrisons had a significant amount of wealth which they used to
leverage control of the Dade County GOP. By 1944, Wesley
Garrison funded most of the local Republican budget and was
entrenched as the most powerful party member in Miami, serving
on the state committee and as a delegate to the Republican
national con~ention.~
Garrison earned his living as Miami's first
"blockbuster," the commonly accepted term for a real estate
developer who purchases homes in white or transitional neighborhoods and sells them to African Americans, usually at substantial profit. In the 1940s Wesley Garrison operated in the
Brownsville neighborhood and his brokering of existing singlefamily homes and the construction of several apartment buildings turned it from majority white to majority African American
by the end of the decade. With the help of elites in the African
American religious and business communities, he had no trouble
finding tenants and buyers. Garrison's actions drew the ire of
other Miami realtors, the Dade County Commission, and the Ku
Klux Klan, which burned crosses and harassed black residents in
Brownsville. Garrison defended his tenants and financed a legal
challenge for fair housing that went all the way to the Florida
Supreme Court, which overturned Dade County's racially restrictive zoning ordinance. For his actions, African Americans in
Miami regarded him favorably.3
Of course, the process of racial transition was never as cut and
dried as its boosters indicated. As Raymond MoN has pointed out,
Miami's demographic changes occurred because &can Americans
sought new and better housing and a number of real estate develop
ers, including the Garrisons, were willing to sell it to them. This did
not mean that the Garrisons were advancing integration, but rather
expanding the boundaries of the black neighborhoods. Over the
past three decades, numerous historians have explored the blockbusting phenomenon in other major metropolitan areas. Most stud-

2.

3.

community and more generally on the state Republican Party, they left no
archival records. What is known has been garnered mostly h m newspapers
accounts and field reports to the presidential candidates.
Paul Walter, Letter to Robert A. Taft, 17 July 1947, Copy in Folder (1948
Campaign-Florida-I-L),
Box 176, Robert A. Taft Papers, Division of
Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, DC [Hereafter cited as Taft
Papers.]
Raymond A. Mohl, "Makingthe Second Ghetto in Metropolitan
Miami, 19401960,"~ m aoflUrban ~ i s t & y21 (March 1995):.41 0-f5:
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ies reveal that black expansion into white neighborhoods created an
atmosphere of tension that sparked white flight and helped pave the
While white
way for a more conservative bent in American p~litics.~
flight certainly happened in Miami, the context was different with
Garrison as he attempted to employ his tenants and customers in his
effort to advance a conservative, anti-New Deal brand of
Republicanism. The Ganison's blockbusting practice generated
what had to be a sizable profit, but the couple certainly seemed committed to bi-racial politics and the w e k e of the African-American
community beyond their real estate practices.
In 1944, Wesley Garrison was the top ranking Republican in
Miami and his presence in the black community added a
unique racial dimension to his public perception. Though
Garrison claimed credit for building the Dade County GOP
from the ground up, the exact number of members he recruited and their racial identification are uncertain, though anecdotally it appears that most of his following came from the
African-American community. Even though the Florida
Republican Party was nominally bi-racial, African Americans
were often shuttled into auxiliary groups and barred from state
conventions due to racism and the prevalence of segregated
facilities. In 1944, for example, a group of black women in
Orlando organized a Republican club but, because of racial
restrictions, were not allowed to affiliate with the statewide
organization of Republican women. The National Federation of
Republican Women, though, regularly allowed African
American clubs to affiliate directly to the national organization,
meaning that the Orlando group had standing at the national
level but none within their own state.5 Despite such backward

4.

5.

See Arnold R Hirsch, Making the Second Ghdto: Race aad Housing in Chicago,
1940-1960 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Arnold R Hirsch
and Raymond Mohl, eds., UrbanPolicy in Twentieth Centu~yAmerica (Piscaraway,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1993);Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban
Crisis: &a and1of P o s I W a T h i t (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1996); Kevin Kruse, White Right: Atlanta and the Making of M o d m
Colzseroat~(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Matthew D.
Lassiter, T h Silent MajOn.9: Suburbm Politics in the Sunbslt South (Princeton,NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2006).
Jane Hamilton, Letter to Marie Grarnm, 11 April 1944, Copy in Folder
(Florida-a££iliated), Box 3, Files of National Federation of Republican
Women, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. [Hereafter cited as
NFRW Papers.]
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practices, the GOP had a sizable black element in the urban
areas of Jacksonville, Orlando, Tampa, and Miami. Garrison's
familiarity and working relationship with the black upper class
in Miami and his status as a defender of civil rights gave him
cachet with these communities and a base of support throughout the state. His financial status and his willingness to donate
funds and time to the organization allowed him to bridge the
gap between the white and black members of the party, even
though Republican leaden from other parts of the state often
criticized him for organizing African Americans.
The Garrisons' ties with the African-American community
meant that their relationship with the entrenched state leadership was at times tenuous, but their most fundamental disagreement arose over party governance, not race. The
Garrisons loathed the county-unit system, the preferred
method of political control that both parties utilized throughout the South. Under Florida election laws, the state executive
committee included one man and one woman from each county even though a number of counties had fewer than ten
Republicans. In 1945 Dade County, for example, had 9,364
registered Republicans while Lafayette County had only one.
Yet, when conducting party business, Dade and Lafayette were
equally represented. Even counties with no registered
Republicans received a vote, a curious circumstance that usually resulted in a member of the leadership exercising a proxy
vote on behalf of the particular county. State committee members from the north central region, like their "porkchopper"
colleagues on the Democratic side, usually pooled their votes
to gain control of the party machinery and make decisions that
served their own interests to the detriment of the more populous counties in the southern region. Throughout most of the
late 1940s and early 1950s, G. Harold Alexander, a state
Republican committee member and later state chairman from
Ft. Myers, and C. C. Spades, the Republican National
Committee (RNC) member from St. Augustine, held the proxy
votes of between ten and twenty of the rural counties and used
their votes to prop up their less-than-active leadership. Spades
and Alexander had virtually no interest in building the party
and did little to register new voters or recruit and groom candidates for office. Since the Garrisons oversaw party activities
in Dade County, they had more supporters and more interest
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in growing the GOP, but the county-unit system kept them
from controlling the state party?
From 1945 through the 1950s, controversy over the countyunit system mounted in light of the postwar migration wave. Due
to a number of "pull" factors including defense contracts and
retirement communities, the urban areas of the state welcomed
thousands of new residents. Most of the migrants to the Miami
area had filiation with the Democratic Party, but a significant
number of Republicans moved to Florida as well. Though the
Tampa Bay region, and most notably Pinellas County, became a
Republican stronghold in the mid 1950s, the contours of the
migration were not readily apparent to those living in the moment.
It certainly appeared to the Garrisons that enough Republicans
from the North and Midwest were relocating to Miami to provide
a stable base for a revitalized GOP. Corresponding changes were
not taking place in rural counties such as Lafayette, Dixie, and
Gilchrist, making the county-unit system even more unrepresentative than it had been prior to World War 11. The rising tide of
migrants contributed to the Garrisons' sense of urgency. If they
succeeded in dismantling the county-unit system, they believed,
the Republican Party could prosper in the state and they could
legitimately claim party leadership and credit for building a twoparty system in Florida, advancing their reputations at the national level.'
6.

'7.

The political calculus favored the Gamsons, even though party registration
was a poor indicator of Republican support in any of the Solid South states.
With v i M y no chance of electing a Republican to state or local office, individuals had to register as Democrats to have a say in the Democratic primary
elections. The winners of those contests either ran unopposed or crushed a
poorly funded, usually unknown Republican in the general election. The primary contests, in short, were the only elections of any importance. Much
more Republican sentiment existed in the state than appeared on the voter
rolls, but when making decisions for the state GOP those registration numbers mattered a great deal and were good indicators of the level of disparity
between Republican voters in south Florida and their brethren in the northern counties.
In 1948, for example, Republican Presidential nominee Thomas E. Dewey
received 194,350votes even though Republican registration was just a shade
under 60,000. See Allen Morris, The Pbridu Handbook, 1947-48 (Tallahassee,
FL: Peninsular Publishing Co., 1949), 222; Brief of the Grass-Roots
Republicans, presented to the Republican National Convention, '7 July 1952,
Copy in Box 33'7, Taft Papers; Peter D. Klingman, N e i t h e r k nm S u w h : A
History of the Republican Party in Horida, 1867-1970(Gainemille, FL: University
of Florida Press, 1984), 148.
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Between 1944 and 1947, the Garrisons and the state leadership
worked well together. Changes in the Florida election law mandated that the Republican Party hold a primary election to determine
the state's Republican national convention delegates and Emory
Ackerman, the chairman of the state executive committee, made
no effort to challenge the law. To the Garrisons, the primary election was the key to defeating the county-unit system. The numerical strength of south Florida, they believed, would discredit the
rural-county coalition and give the Garrisons the opportunity to
lobby the national party to remove rural-bloc leaders Spades and
Alexander. Ackerman went along with the plan and also backed
Florence Garrison for a seat on the RNC. The climate certainly
looked favorable for overturning county-unit rule in Florida.
Between the time of the initial negotiations and the state convention in March 1948, however, the situation changed dramatically. Alexander, looking to maintain rural superiority, had cut a deal
with one of the presidential candidates,New York Governor Thomas
E. Dewey, and his campaign manager Herbert Brownell. Alexander
and Spades offered to steer the Florida delegation towards Dewey at
the Republican national convention in exchange for Dewey's future
support for the rural bloc against Ackerman and the Garrisons.
Brownell promised that Spades and Alexander would be the patronage brokersfor the state for the anticipated Dewey administmtion,
giving them the power to determine who received federal appointments in the Sunshine State. Patronage was the lifeblood of the
Southern Republican parties. Party leadem throughout the South
kept their organizations small and controllable and maintained the
loyalty of their supporters through promises of key appointments in
the fbture. Colonel Rentfko B. Creager, an RNC member fi-om
Texas, was the best example of this tactic. Derided in the local press
as the "Japanese Gardner" for his propensity to shape the party as
one would a Bonsai tree, G-eager used the promise of keyjobs to followers to defeat challenges to his leaders hi^.^ Alexander and Spades
behaved in much the same way and hoped to use Brownell's support
to prop up their authority. They used their relationship with
Brownell to unify the rural counties against Ackerman in exchange
for positions from the expected Dewey White House.
8.

Interview with Joe Ingraham and H. Jack Porter, conducted 9 November
19'72. Copy in Eisenhower Libmy Oral History Collection, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
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Brownell's actions illustrate the multifaceted and pragmatic
nature of the American political system, as Florida was one state in
a region-wide strategy for party control. Since 1944, th
Republican Party had fractured into two factions. One group,
under Dewey, promoted a moderately conservative platform that
acknowledged the importance of the New Deal and espoused policies more friendly to labor unions and minorities in order to build
a new majority coalition. A rival organization, led by Ohio Senator
Roben A. Taft, believed the only way to regain the White House
was througha stronger consemtism that placed primacy on the
free market and a strict interpretation of the Constitution. In 1948,
the Taft and Dewey groups were roughly equal in size and popularity, meaning neither group could guarantee a majority of delegates before the 1948 national convention. As a result, both
national factions became heavily involved in local and state matters
in order to recruit convention delegates pledged to their candidate. This tightly contested situation meant that normally minor
disputes at the local and state levels could have repercussions at
the highest levels of the party. Brownell, hoping to raid Taft's sup
porters in the South, promised to lavishly reward states and state
leaders that backed Dewey in 194£L9
The Garrisons, aware of the national climate, reached out to;
both factions hoping to trade their influence in Florida for assis-:
tance with their own party building efforts. In July 194'7, a Taft'
associate reported that Wesley Garrison was the "key man" in the
first district of Florida and would control the two state convention
representatives from the area. The writer pointed out that
Garrison had backed conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker in
1944 and advised someone to keep frequent contact with him and
cultivate his support10 Garrison, though, was more interested inr!
8

9.

Brownell recruited and groomed Republicans in a number of southern states
to challenge the existing state leadership for control of their national conven- ;
tion delegations. In Alabama, for example,
Vardaman, the state party chairman, and offered him
he swung the delegation away from RNC m
Thomas E. Stephens, Memo to Herbert Brownell, 13 May 1947. Copy in
Folder 2 (Alabama), Box 21, Series 11, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, Department ,
of Rare Books, Special Collections, and Presemtion, University of Rochester ,
Library, Rochester, NY [Hereaftercited as Dewey Papers]; Herbert Brownell, 11
Letter to Claude Vardaman, 13September 1947. Copy in Folder 2 (Alabama), :,I
Box 21, Series 11, Dewey Papers.
10. Paul Walter, Letter to Robert A. Taft, 17 July 194'7. Copy in Folder (1948 ,,!
Campaign-Florida-I-L)
, Box 176, Taft Papers.
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contrdling the Florida party than choosing a candidate on the
basis of principle or past alliance and sought to trade his delegate
votes to the faction most likely to advance his political career. In
October 1947, Garrison wrote to Dewey announcing the creationl
of the Miami Republican Headquarters Club at 1947 W. Flagler
Street, four miles south of the heart of the Brownsville neighborhood he had developed. In a letter that read more like a real estate
advertisement than a bid for support, Gamson explained that he
had bought the building and paid for its operation with his own
funds, and,in just a matter of weeks, made it the most important
GOP institution in south Florida. He claimed that the club's members, most likely his tenants and the Brownsville African-American
Leadership, would all back Dewey in the 1948 Republican primary
and that their sheer numbem would enable Dewey to overpower
the small group of Republicans in the state's northern regions.
Garrison strongly implied that, if Dewey helped Garrison advance
within the state party, he and Florence could influence the Florida
delegation to vote for Dewey at the national convention. In a party
long controlled by a few individuals Garrison believed that his
Headquarters Club gave him the popular support to defeat the
rural counties in the upcoming primary."
Garrison's sales pitch and his work outside the regular organization were indicative of both the disenfranchisement of AfricanAmericans in Florida and the rural control of the state party, two
local factors that influenced Brownell's decision to back Spades
and Alexander. During the postwar period political clubs, group
ings of like-minded individuals who generally supported one of the
two major parties while functioning outside the official apparatus,
experienced a renaissance. Political clubs mobilized disenfranchised or marginalized populations to challenge state and local
party leaders in the hopes of gaining a voice in the system or advocating reform. One of the most notable examples, the East Bay
Democratic Club of Oakland, California, acted on behalf of the
local African-American community and helped break the stranglehold of the conservative downtown establishment on local politics. l2 Following the 1948 presidential election, the National
11. Wesley Garrison, Letter to momas Stephens, 28 October 1947, Copy in
Folder (Florida), Box 22, Dewey Papers.
12. For more on the East Bay Democratic Club, see Robert 0.Self, American
l&d$un: Race and the SEruggEG fm PosWar Oakland (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
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Republican Round-Up Club, an organization centered in Chicago
with a sizable membership and wealthy financial backers, advocated a strong conservative platform and helped push the GOP to the
right in the 1950 congressional elections.13 The club structure was
useful because it allowed individuals to cultivate grassroots support
specifically to challenge the ruling party oligarchy at the polls.
Garrison hoped to use the club to swarm the small parties of the
northern counties in the 1948 primary elections. Though he was a
member of the state executive committee himself, building a
broad base among the voters outside the regular party would
enable him to outflank the existing GOP leadership and seize the
reins of the state committee.
In his letter to Dewey, Garrison cast himself as a party
reformer, someone who wanted to build a two-party system in the
South. The keys to his strategy were the preferential primary election and Florence's ascendancy to the RNC, but the backing of a
national candidate who would determine the state's patronage
arrangements would also be beneficial. Unfortunately for the
Garrisons, the Dewey faction was not interested. Brownell believed
that the support of the rural county organization would provide
the most delegates. His decision, made solely with the goal of winning the presidential nomination in 1948, helped entrench the
county-unit system in Florida and weakened the bi-racial coalition
the Garrisons had built in Miami.
At the 1948 state convention, Alexander used the proxy votes
from the smaller counties and his alliances in the northern part of
the state to defeat Florence's bid to the RNC and elect one of his
associates, much to the chagrin of Ackerman. This turn of events
stunned the Garrisons, who interpreted the loss as a sign that the
rural counties could not be trusted and would impede future party
development as well as their own political fortunes.14 Ironically,
many regarded the Dewey camp as the Republican organization
with the most forward-looking policies on race. Dewey had lobbied
e New York legislature for the creation of the first state Fair
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13. For more on the NRRC, see Report of the Committee on Republican
Fundamental Principles of the National Republican Roundup Committee,
Chicago, Ill., 10-11 November 1949. Copy in Folder (Republican Strategy
Committee (2)), Box 7, Arthur Summerfield Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas.
14. Wesley Garrison, Letter to Clarence Brown, 16 July 1948, Copy in Folder
(1948 Campaign-Florida-GH), Box 176, Taft Papers.
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11
Employment Practices Committee and had sought to make the
national GOP more inclusive for minorities. Yet here Brownell,
Dewey's closest adviser, backed a racially intolerant faction over an
organization built ostensibly on bi-racial unity.
Immediately before the Republican National Convention, with
Alexander aligned with Dewey, Garrison pledged his allegiance to
the Taft faction. In a field report to the Taft campaign, an observer noted that "Garrison will not be against Bob [Taft], but he is
most interested in doing anything he can to push his wife as
National Committeewoman. However, if we sit down on him he is
going to have trouble in not voting for Bob." The correspondent
went on to observe that Garrison's challenger for the delegate seat
was "a much better citizen than Garrison," a contention that most
likely had racial overtones arising from Garrison's poor standing
within the Miami real estate community for his blockbusting.15
Another report, written ten days prior, claimed that Garrison had
the Miami delegate race sewn up and that no candidate, regardless
of his or her reputation or following, could defeat him.16 Clarence
Brown, a congressman from Ohio and Taft's campaign manager,
counted Ganison as one of the six committed Taft delegates from
the Sunshine state.'' He was also evidently critical to Taft's nomination plans; as Garrison was among a handful of individuals
whom Taft's advisors encouraged him to call in the days before the
convention in order to discuss parliamentary strategy.18
Taft, however, could not stop the Dewey bandwagon. The
1944 candidate once again won his party's nomination, becoming
the first individual in Republican history to lead the ticket a second
time after losing a general election. Taft received six votes, including Garrison's, out of Florida's eighteen. Garrison, however, took
Taft's loss as an opportunity to continue his local organizing.
Shortly after the convention Garrison wrote to Brown, saying
'What I would appreciateyour doing for me, is to write Gov. Dewey
and explain my position, that by advocating an active primary sys15. Jack McKay, Letter to John Marshall, 12 March 1948, Copy in Florida (1948
Campaign Miscellany-John Marshall-1947-8), Box 233, Taft Papers.
16. Unsigned,memo, 2 March 1948,Copy in Folder (1948 Campaign-FloridaA-B),Box 175, Taft Papers.
17. Clarence Brown, Letter to Henry Gibson, 26 May 1948, Copy in Folder (1948
Campaign-Florida-H)
,Box 1'76, Taft Papers.
18. Dewitt Sage, Letter to Robert A. Taft, 2 June 1948, Copy in Folder (1948
Campaign MisceUany-Correspan&nce-T-w) , Box 230, Taft Papers.
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tem not only here in Florida, but all thru the south, the greatest
progress will result in our efforts to firmly establish an active
Republican party here. Contrary, to the beliefs of most of our socalled republican [sic] leaders here, votes come before patronage."lg Brown passed Garrison's message on to Brownell, who
promptly dismissed it with no response.20
In the month following the national convention, Brownell designated Alexander to oversee the party's south Florida efforts.
Ackerman, still chairman of the Florida Republican executive committee, rightly saw such an arrangement as a threat to his leadership and asked Brownell to follow the "law and custom" in Florida
by naming him as state campaign manager. Race played a factor in
this decision as well, as Ackerman noted that Alexander was known
as a "lilywhite" and his leadership would repulse many African
American voters. Ackerman also pointed out that Alexander was
tied to the "small county" group and had no experience in mobilizing voters.21Brownell, unwilling to break his deal with Spades
and Alexander, refused to remove Alexander from his leadership
position. As predicted, Alexander was an ineffective campaign
manager and his get out the vote efforts failed miserably. He was,
however, a competent backroom politician and parlayed his official position in the Dewey campaign and his ties with Spades to
become state party chairman by a vote of 80-18 the following
year.22
Following the 1948 election, with Spades and Alexander now
firmly in control of the party machinery, the Garrisons resumed
their strategy of organizing at the grassroots to challenge to the
rural leadership. In 1950, Florence Garrison played a key role in
the chartering of the Florida Federation of Women's Republican
Clubs (FFWR). Under national party rules, a state with a certain
number of women's clubs could form its own state federation, an
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19. Wesley Garrison, Letter to Clarence Brown, 16 July 1948, Copy in Folder
(1948 Campaign-Florida-GH),
Box 1'76,Taft Papers.
20. Herbert Brownell, Letter to Wesley Garrison, 2 August 1948, Copy in Folder
(Garrison,Wesley), Box 13'7,Herbert Brownell Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library, Abilene, Kansas. [Hereafter cited as Brownell Papers.]
21. Emory Ackerman, Letter to Herbert Brownell, 3 August 1948, Copy in Folder
(Ackerman,Emory), Box 133, Brownell Papers.
22. Emory Ackerman, Letter to Herbert Brownell, 11 October 1946, Copy in
Folder (Ackerman, Emory), Box 133, Brownell Papers; "Brief of the
AlexanderSpades State Committee Delegation," '7 July 1952, Copy in Folder
(1952 Convention Delegate Contests-Florida), Box 129, Brownell Papers.
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WESLEY
AND FLORENCE
GARRISON
umbrella group that coordinated club activity and acted as a liaison with the national GOP. Florence Garrison worked with Ethel
Parks, the RNC member from Florida and an ally of Spades, to
organize the requisite number and, in the summer of 1950,
Garrison formally received recognition from the National
Federation of Republican Women's Clubs. Garrison was elected
president of the state federation.23The GOP of this period used
clubwomen for voter mobilization and precinct work, but rarely
This tradition
expected them to have any impact on party
likely explains why Parks and Ganison worked together, as the
Alexander group did not see the FFWR as a threat Florence's position as FFWR president gave the Garrisons another official title
within the state organization and further bolstered their reputation in both state and national circles.
The creation of FFWR, while beneficial to the party, was another strategic maneuver to break the county-unit system and reduce
the power of the rural county bloc. For example, in late 1950 the
Garrisons used the FFWR in a transparent and ill-advised effort to
weaken the standing of Florida's RNC members. Florence
Garrison wrote to Bertha Adkins, director of the RNC Women's
Division, asking for more power in approving the speakers
assigned to the various Lincoln Day fund-raising dinners throughout the state, a task traditionally given to the RNC members. Her
rationale was that many counties had such little Republican W a tion and, in her estimation, often the county woman's club was the
only organized GOP group. She contended that the current state
of affairs was indicative of poor party leadership, saying 'I do not
intend to mention any names, but in past years great confusion has
resulted and many people were discouraged in assisting the
Republican
Adkins summarily rejected her request. Once
again, the Garrisons believed that acting as a conduit between
Florida and the national party and building alliances that could
reward supporters with patronage jobs was the surest way to
assume leadership at the state level.
23. Ethel Parks, Letter to Mrs. Joseph Farrington, 18 November 1950, Copy in
Folder Florida (2), Box 23, NFRW Papers.
24. Catherine E. Rymph, Republican Women: Feminism and Consmatism porn
Suflagz thmugtr ths f i e ofthe N m Rz.ght (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006).
25. Florence Garrison, Letter to Bertha Adkins, 9 December 1950, Cc@%Folder
(Florida-General "1") ,Box 17' , NFRW Papers.

Published by STARS, 2009

13

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 88 [2009], No. 1, Art. 3

As the Garrisons gained power, they left in their wake a trail of
enemies throughout the state. The couple adopted an aggressive
political style that alienated many. According to the numerous letters of complaint they generated over their two decade career, the
Garrisons would quickly denounce and ostracize, in the most
explicit terms possible, those who disagreed with them. Florence
Garrison, especially, had a tendency to red-bait her opponents.26
Mrs. Frederick Gramm, the chairman of the Orange County
Council of Republican Women, informed the National Federation
director that "I am working along with Florence Garrison and
doing everything I can to help her, but Oh! Betty-why do the
Garrisons always have to FIGHT someone! [Sic] Every time someone in this state looms to the stature of real leadership-the
Garrisons find something to fight him or her about."27This sentiment was repeated throughout the state as the Garrisons rose to
prominence. The animosity they created complicated their role
and their standing within the party. Critics often linked their
destructive personalities and their ties to the black community in
their complaints. A 1954 memo to the RNC, written as a neutral
field report, claimed that the Garrisons "are people of large means
derived from the purchase of delinquent tax certificates and the
sale of negro properties. They are utterly lacking in tact and are
completely irreconcilable with the opinions of others who differ
with them, however slightly. They have attempted but have failed,
to build up the party on the basis of negro regi~tration."~~
The
racial aspects of the Garrisons' activity were usually connected with
their controversial political style and both deemed as distasteful to
many Florida Republicans.
Despite their abrasive personalities, going into the 1952 election cycle the Garrisons retained their influence in Miami. Though
Wesley had ceded the Dade County chairmanship to an ally, he

26. For example, in a letter to RNC Chairman Leonard Hall, Florence asked
rhetorically "are we in Florida in an atomic age operating under archaic regulations, or perhaps modern iron curtain methods"when referring to Spades
and Alexander. Florence Garrison, Letter to Leonard Hall, 22July 1953, Copy
in Folder (Florida Situation (P)), Box 172, Leonard Hall Papers, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library, Abiline, Kansas. [Hereafter cited as Hall Papers.]
47. Mrs.Frederick R Gramm, Letter to Mrs. Joseph Farrington, 19 August 1951,
Copy in Folder Florida (I), Box 23, NFRW Papers.
28. "The Republican Party in Florida," unsigned and undated, Copy in Folder
(Florida Situation 1954), Box 1'78, Hall Papers,
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remained on the state executive committee while Florence continued to lead the FFWR.Their positions made them once again critically important in the run up to the national convention. Among
presidential candidates, the GOP remained divided into two major
factions, one for Dewey and one for Taft, with a host of minor figures such as Harold Stassen and Earl Warren trying to mount
regional dark horse candidacies. General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
who in late 1951 entered the presidential picture, ran with the
backing of the Dewey group. Though he went on to win landslide
victories over Democrat Adlai Stevenson in both 1952 and 1956,
Eisenhower had a tough road to the Republican nomination. Taft
had won the hearts of the more conservative members of the party
and, until the first ballot of the national convention, was a plausible contender. With the nomination battle looking increasingly
tight yet again, every delegate mattered. As in 1948, candidate
organizations had to wade into purely local and state matters to
bargain for support or risk losing critical votes at the national convention, when popularity and support mattered most. This meant
that the national leaders would have to deal with the Garrisons.
In their quest for convention delegates, Taft's campaign officers kept tabs on the Miami and Florida situations. In late 1951,
David Ingalls, a former undersecretary of the Navy and Taft's
cousin, approached Garrison for support and issued a sobering
report of their meeting. "[Tlhere's going to be a hell of a fight
down in Florida, and we are going to have to decide what to do
about it," Ingalls noted to Taft's executive assistant I. Jack Martin.
"I don't think there is going to be any chance of getting the two
sides together in Florida, under any circumstance^."^ Garrison was
completely focused on the state situation, as Ingalls believed that
Garrison would swing the Miami delegates for Taft if, and only if,
the Taftites cut their ties with the regular delegation. B. Carroll
Reece, acting in his role as Taft's Southern regional campaign
manager, advised Martin to align their camp with the AlexanderSpades faction. Reece, himself the leader of the small, ineffectual
Tennessee state party, understood that Garrison's calls for a primary had little bearing on the national convention delegation and
was purely a local matter. He told Martin that "One thing is for certain, [the Taft faction] cannot hold the State organization and play
29. David Ingalls, Letter to I. Jack Martin, 1 September 1951, Copy in Folder
(1952--Campaign Miscellany-David Ingalls (2)),Box 454, Taft Papers.
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with Garrison. The two are incompatible..Agam,my opinion is, the
best chance for getting the delegation is to work with Mr.
Alexander and the State Committee."" Alexander, who had grown
weary of Dewey and his approval of New York's Fair Employment
Practices law, signed on with the Taft faction and planned to select
a delegation that would overwhelmingly endorse the Ohio senator.
In 1952, holding a delegation for a particular candidate would
be easier than in 1948 as changes to the Florida election laws had
removed the requirement for a primary election. Alexander, well
aware of the implications of direct elections, dropped the primary
and made it known that the state committee would handpick
national convention delegates at the state convention in
Gainesville. During the legislative session of 1951, the legislature
rejected a petition to require a primary contest. Later that year the
Ganisons and their ally, Dade County Chairman John Booth, filed
a lawsuit to force the state party to restore the primary contests.
According to Florence, who defended her actions to the FFRW
members, 'In 1949 the election laws were deliberately changed to
disenfranchise ~epublicanvoters by Republican leader [sic] inter~ention."~'
The case went to the Florida Supreme Court, which
ruled that the law as written did not mandate a primary and was
constitutional. Alexander, ecstatic at the decision, wrote Taft campaign manager Clarence Brown saying wred you a few minutes
ago relative to the decision of the Supreme Court. It apparently
gives us permission to do everything but shoot Garrison and I
would assume that this is not a legal question but a matter of civic
duty."" Alexander, with the help of the Democratic state legislature, had tightened his control of the Florida GOP and thwarted
the Garrisons' attempt to break the county-unit system.
Changes in the national picture also complicated matters in
Florida. Brownell, still Dewey's chief ally and political strategist,
took charge of the preconvention campaign of Dwight D.

30. B. Carroll Reece, memo to I. Jack Martin, 6 December 1951, Copy in Folder
(1952 Campaign-Florida-H),
Box 337, Taft Papers.
31. Florence Garrison, "Open Letter to the Club Presidents of the Florida
Federation of Women's Republican Clubs," 13 December 1951, Copy in
Folder (Florida (1)), Box 23, NFRW Papers.
32. G.H. Alexander, Letter to Clarence Brown, 5 February 1952. Copy in Folder
(A), Box 18, Clarence Brown Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus,
Ohio.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol88/iss1/3

16

Bowen: The Strange Tale of Wesley and Florence Garrison: Racial Crosscur

WESLEY
AND FLORENCE
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Eisell~lower'sMiami ~4mpaignteam included a number of Democrats, including
Mayor William Wolfarth (secondfrom left). Kirk Landon (first from left) and Paul
Helliwell (second from right) managed the campaign with Helliwell becoming the
top Republican in Miami during the Eisenhower administration, greatly diminishing the importance of the Garrisons. I m p courtesy of the Dwight D. Eisenhower
Libray, Abiline, Kansas.

Eisenhower. As in 1948, he believed that raiding Taft's delegate
support in the South remained the surest way to the nomination
and offered patronage considerations for delegate support
throughout the Old Confederacy. Alexander and Spades, unsure
of Eisenhower's stance on civil rights, pledged themselves to the
Taft faction. Rather than working with the Garrisons in their quest
for a Republican primary to unlock the rural dominance of the
Spades-Alexander group, however, Brownell recruited Miami
attorneys Kirk Landon and Paul Helliwell and created a new state
faction to challenge the state chairman. Both men were recent
migrants and experienced Republican operatives. Helliwell held
national offices in the Young Republicans and Landon had managed Wendell Willkie's 1940 campaign in Maryland. While his
background initially won Landon no friends among the Dewey
camp who to a man regretted Willkie's ascension, he did have
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knowledge of Republican procedures and enough contacts to
assemble a viable slate of delegates pledged to Eisenhower.
Brownell and the Eisenhower managers appointed Landon as
head of the Florida Citizens for Eisenhower, an ostensibly non-partisan organization that organized at the grassroots, much like
Garrison's Republican Headquarters Club. Garrison initially
approached Landon, looking to work together against the rural
leadership but Landon, well aware of Garrison's poisonous reputation, rejected his overtures.
Throughout 1952 the Garrisons continued to decry the state
party's refusal to hold a primary election and ultimately challenged Spades and Alexander at the state convention at
G a i n e d e . Their tactics caused a great deal of controversy, but
did help the Eisenhower forces gain a foothold in the state.
Garrison had control of the Miami GOP while Helliwell and
Landan had no standing within the state organization. Landon,
aware of Alexander's frustration with Garrison, approached the
state chairman and offered to work with him and Spades against
Garrison in exchange for one pro-Eisenhower delegate to the
national convention. Both Alexander and the Taft leadership
knew that Landon planned to "convertn delegates once he
received a seat, but they viewed it as worth the risk in order to quiet
Garrison. The latter was, of course, impossible. Garrison immediately declared his intention to challenge the seating of the Florida
delegation at the national convention on the grounds that the
absence of a primary had disenfranchised the voters of south
Florida. Brownell and the Eisenhower organization endorsed
Landon's strategy and did not weigh in on Garrison's challenge
before the RNC credentials committee, primarily because the double-dealing Florida leadership had sent an exploratory message to
former RNC Chairman and Eisenhower backer Hugh Scott asking
for favorable consideration from the Eisenhower group. Spades,
though publicly committed to Taft, assured Scott that he would be
"perfectly satisfied with the number of votes for Eisenhower." The
Eisenhower group did not make Florida an issue and the Spades
group was seated by a unanimous vote of the Credentials
C~rnmittee.~~

33. C. C. Spades, Letter to Hugh Scott, 24 March 1952. Copy in Folder (1952
Convention Delegate Contests-Florida), Borc 129, Brownell Papers.
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Once Eisenhower took the White House, the Republicans
found themselves in the majority for the first time in over two
decades. Although the new president faced numerous challenges
at home and abroad, patronage was the most pressing problem for
the party. Because of the long period between the Hoover and
Eisenhower administrations, there was no ready-made group of
office seekers with which to s t a E the executive branch, making the
transition period fhirly chaotic. With so many individuals claiming
credit for the victory through their work with the Republican
Party, including the non-partisan Citizens for Eisenhower and the
Democrats for Eisenhower, patronage distribution quickly became
another point of intense controversy between the Garrisons, the
Alexander-Spades group, and the Helliwell-Landon contingent.
Leonard Hall, a former congressman from Long Island, New York,
who chaired the RNC during Eisenhower's first six years in office,
collaborated with the White House on patronage distribution. A
confidential survey of the Florida situation, taken sometime
around May 1953, revealed the obstacles associated with building
a stable base in the Sunshine State. The report immediately
acknowledged that Eisenhower won his 100,000-plus majority
because of his popularity and gave no thanks to the SpadesAlexander leadership, which it referred to as "reactionary."
Sounding reminiscent of a Wesley Garrison mass-mailing, the
author of this document concluded that the county-unit system
had effectively disenfkanchised the Republicans from Tampa
southward and if voters had selected their delegates via primary all
18 of them would have voted for Ike on the first ballot. "Denying
Florida Republicans the opportunity to elect Convention delegates
by primary certainly has not helped to build the party," the report
said, "and it will not strengthen the national administration during
the next four years. No amount of patronage fertilizer will green
grass barren of roots and G.O.P. roes in Florida are almost barren
over wide areas." 34
Rather than endorsing Garrison, the most vocal proponent of
the primary election and the development of the two-party system,
the report advised the Citizens for Eisenhower group to handle
patronage matters and credited Landon, who had passed away
I

34. Memo, "Florida Politics," undated, Copy in Folder (109-A-7 ( Z ) ) , Box 543,
Presidential Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, General File Series, Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. [Hereafter cited as General File.J
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since the election, and Helliwell, for Florida going into the
Republican column.35 A state advisory committee, set up by
Alexander with input from the Citizens groups, approved patronage appointments for all counties except for Dade. As Alexander
phrased it, 'Due to internal dissension, Dade was excepted for the
present from the regular county procedure to insure that Party
matters will be handled on a fair and impartial basis. It was the consensus of opinion that it is doubtful that Party affairs can be prop
erly evaluated where Party officials cannot agree." Alexander put
together a four-person committee to approve nominees from
Dade County and did not include the Garrisons or their associates?
Despite an awareness of the county-unit system's flaws, no one
in Washington would lift a finger to help the Garrisons. Instead,
attention shifted to the S t Petersburg area where Bill Crarner, the
1952 Republican candidate for Florida's first congressional district, appeared to have the best chance of building the party.
Pinellas County had elected a slew of Republicans to local offices
in 1950 and sent Cramer to the state House of Representatives. In
1952 Cramer lost an open seat election to Democrat Courtney
Campbell by just under 1,900 votes. The RNC regarded the
Pinellas County organization as the strongest group in the state
and made it a point to give them adequate financing and attent i ~ nIn
. ~1954
~ Cramer would win the Congressional seat by just
over 1,500 votes. It was the Pinellas organization, rather than the
Garrisons in Miami, who made the most compelling case against
Alexander's leadership and the grassroots mobilization of Florida
Republicans.
In May 1953 Fred Petersen, a Republican who held Cramer's
old seat in the state House, introduced a bill that would limit representation on the state political parties to counties with at least two
percent of its populations registered with that party. If passed, of
course, this measure would take away the monopoly of the smaller
northern counties and shift the balance of power to the TampaSarasota-Miami axis. Alexander, in a bizarre incident that seemed
reminiscent of a bad television show, apparently tried to blackmail
35. Ibid.
36. G.H. Alexander, Memo to Republican Officials, 20 March 1953, Folder
(Florida Situation 1955 (1)) ,Box 172, Hall Papers.
57. Memo, "Florida Politics," undated, Copy in Folder (109-A-7(2)),Box 543,
General File.
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Petersen into withdrawing the bill when he turned up in Petersen's
office with copies of letters from Petersen's ex-wife concerning their
especially nasty divorce proceedings. Rather than accede to
Alexander's demands, Petersen called a press conference and
announced the presence of the letters and decried this "brazen
attempt to control my future actions." The bill ultimately failed in
committee, but it put the state leadership on notice that the small
county domination would not likely continue for very long.38
Another line of attack on Petersen was to malign him in the press as
a supporter of the Gamsons, a tactic which Petersen called "conclusive evidence of the desperateness and insecurity of your position."3g
The Garrisons did try to get involved with the Petersen legislation as part of their continued advocacy for a permanent primary
system but failed. In July, the Gamsons and a number of allies met
in Orlando and issued an open letter to Eisenhower, Hall, and the
Florida Republican leadership asking for a national investigation of
the county-unit system and its implications. Calling themselves the
"Republican Committee for Good Government," the group decried
the current system which allowed Alexander and Spades to "control
the political pie-counter and distribute patronage as they see fit."
The Garrisons argued that such tactics kept the party small and
functionally useless. Spades and Alexander, for their part, dismissed the Garrisons as little more than attention seekers.
Officially, Hall responded to Florence with a terse note saying: "As
you know, I cannot, as the National Chairman, become involved in
State factional fights and I cannot, in particular, become involved
in county fights. Since there are over 3000 counties in this country,
you can imagine the problems involved."40Though they agreed in
principle, the national organization gave the Garrisons no support.
The shunning of the Garrisons was partly due to their tendency to engage in counterproductiveinfighting and partly due to the
racial dimension of their politics. In fact, their advocacy of civil
rights, at the time an emergent political issue in the South, continually repelled potential allies. Racial undertones are evident in
much of the correspondence regarding the Garrisons and

38. St. Petersburg Times, 22 May 1953.
39. Fred Petersen, Letter to G. H. Alexander, 15 May 1953, Copy in (GF 109-A-2
Florida 1952-1953 ( I ) ) , Box 496, General File.
40. Leonard Hall, Letter to Florence Garrison, 3 September 1953, Copy in Folder
(Florida Situation 1953 ( 2 ) ) , Box 172, Hall Papers.
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Republican politics in general. Kent McKinley, the chairman of the
Sarasota Country Republican Executive Committee and a former
GOP candidate for Congress informed White House chief of staff
Sherman Adams that "The [Fair Employment Practices
Committee] is not for the South, and never can be unless you want
to mongrelize the white race. Sounds funny, but is dead serious. I
do subscribe to that thinking loo%." McKinley goes on in his letter to argue for Pinellas and Sarasota Counties as patronage overseers, since they have a larger percentage of the registered
Republicans than their neighbors to the north. Populous counties
were the key to expanding the two-party system in McKinley's
mind, but only if the party membership remained white.41
Race remained the key stumbling block to the Garrisons' success though, to their credit, they continued to organize in a biracial fashion. The racial aspects of the Miami Republican split
came into full focus during the Lincoln Day dinner fiasco of 1955.
Unwilling to work with each other, the Garrison and Helliwell factions each hosted their own Lincoln Day dinners, traditionally the
high point of Republican fund raising drives. The Helliwell group
held their dinner on Friday, February 11, with Utah Senator
Arthur Watkins delivering the keynote address. The Garrisons
scheduled theirs for Saturday, February 12 at the Urmey Hotel in
downtown Miami with the RNC dispatching Indiana
Congresswoman Cecil B. Harden to address the crowd. It was not
unusual for multiple organizations within one county or municipality to sponsor their own Lincoln Day gatherings and the presence of Watkins and Harden shows that both events had sanction
from the state and national parties. The differences between the
festivities, though, were in sharp relief in typical Garrison fashion.
The Helliwell event went on without a hitch. But shortly after
events began at the Urmey, the hotel's owner, E. N. Claughton,
stormed into the banquet hall and demanded that the twenty-four
African Americans in attendance leave the segregated facility
immediately. According to the reporter for the Miami Herald, a
"near riot broke out" between white members of the Dade County
Executive Committee, outraged by the demands, and Claughton
and his associates. As the two groups shouted at each other,
Claughton threatened to switch off the electricity and end the
41. Kent McKinley, Letter to Sherman Adams, 8 March 1953, Copy in Folder (GF
109-A-2 Florida 1952-1953 (1)), Box 496, General File.
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event all together, a statement which prompted the black audience members to rise t~ their feet. In a bit of delicious symbolism
not lost on the Herald reporter, a black clergyman with "a large
gold cross hanging from his neck," led them out of the hall and
into the lobby. Garrison, highlighting the irony of the situation,
took the microphone and declared that he would not be party to
an event named in honor of Abraham Lincoln that was not open
to all citizens. He and Florence then walked out, along with an
estimated 130 whites, leaving some 120 attendees in the room
with a distressed Harden at the head table. When order was
restored, Harden spoke to the remaining attendees, after briefly
noting the "unfortunate occurrence," on the impending decline
'< ;
of the Solid
$i;l !ji$aq$j??;~~~<~
7
Over the next four days, the Herald reported on the charges
!, '
and counter-charges between Claughton and Garrison. Claughton
contended that he was not told in advance that African Americans
would be in attendance and blamed Garrison for purposely hosting an integrated event in a segregated facility in order to draw
publicity and "exploit the colored people." In the time of Massive
Resistance, many in the South appreciated this, with the Georgia
state House of Representatives passing a resolution praising
Claughton for his action. The mayor of Miami countered with a
statement labeling Claughton's racial views unrepresentative of the
i:);,;
city's population. Garrison denied that the event was purposeful
:,:;!,;d
' 11:.
but did threaten a number of lawsuits. The editors of the Herald
'
,.
'
came down somewhere in the middle, noting the shocking and
;,&,I8!
belligerent behavior of hotel management while contending that
'
J,,J,j,
,\ , ; ,( ; ,
Garrison or one of his supporters had to have known what would
'V
transpire. Neither group was absolved, but the paper believed that
':
the situation would have been easily avoidable. In actuality, it
,,
seems highly likely that the Garrisons staged the event to advance
his standing in the GOP. At the time, a number of Florida legisla.
p,
tors had introduced bills to uphold segregated schools and nullify
,.
the Supreme Court's Brown v. Board of Education decision. The
/:
;,'
Lincoln Day activities, as they transpired in the press, illustrated
, (,'
,,,r
that the Florida GOP continued to hold firm to the color line
,,:,,;.
despite the Garrisons' public efforts to the contrary."
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42. Miami Herald, 12 February 1955.
43. Miami Herald, 13 February, 14 February, and 15 February 1955.
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Almost immediately Garrison sought to capitalize on the publicity and advance his fight against the state leadership. He wrote
to Eisenhower pleading with the President to issue a statement
decrying the events at the Urmey Hotel. He took credit for registering the African-American members who had been removed
from the dinner, a claim very likely true, and hoped for a forthright stance from Washington favoring racial equality.
Administration staff shuttled the letter back and forth among
themselves while deciding on a response. Ultimately Val
Washington, an African American and head of the "Negro
Division" of the RNC, told Adams to ignore Garrison. In a memo
to Eisenhower attached to Garrison's letter, Adams directed the
president that "if you must reply, have to be blunt and tell Pres
can't interfere-local-appears
Mr. Garrison fomented difficulty."
There is no record of a response from the White House, but it is
clear that Len Hall once again shunned Garrison. One month
after the events at the Urmey, Hall was the keynote speaker at a
hastily arranged fund-raiser for the state party with notable attendees including Spades, Alexander, and four African Americans:
the Garrisons were conspicuously absent." Though the Garrisons
continued to complain loudly, neither the RNC nor the White
House would give them any assistance.
While the Garrisons sustained their advocacy for a bi-racial,
expanded two party system in Florida, the larger factional dispute
continued at the national level. Despite Taft's death in 1953, ideological conservatives continued to operate throughout the
Eisenhower administration to the point that, by 1956, former Taft
supporters were preparing to nominate one of their own should
Eisenhower refuse to run for a second term. Garrison, ever the
political opportunist, threw himself in to these proceedings with
an eye on making Florence the national committeewoman for
Florida. The right-wing Republicans pinned their hopes on Senate
Majority Leader William F. Knowland of California. After Taft's
death, Knowland seemed the most likely to spearhead the burgeoning conservative movement within the GOP. He was not as
skilled a politician as Taft and was more focused on foreign policy,
especially American involvement in Asia, so this transition of leadership was not as smooth as either Knowland or the remnants of

44. Miami Times, 26 March 1955.
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the Taft faction would have liked. He was, however the only conservative with enough national stature to lead the old Taft faction.
Under normal circumstances, a dissident group or minority
faction would dare not challenge the incumbent president and
his organization, but 1956 was not a normal election cycle. In
1955 Eisenhower suffered a heart attack and his health was a matter of doubt for both the public and the party. Knowland, seeing
his opportunity to take back the party for the conservatives, began
quietly assembling Republican delegate slates under the banner
of "Ike-First-Knowland," meaning that delegates pledged to his
cause would support Eisenhower first but, if the president did not
run for re-election, would back Knowland. Because of the political dangers associated with bucking one's party leadership,
Knowland sought support from nominally Republican groups and
clubs who backed the party but did not have a stake in the regular organization.
Sometime in late 1955, Knowland and his associates reached
out to Garrison's Republican Headquarters Club and asked for
help in organizing a delegate slate. Their efforts, though, were
short-lived and futile. By March 1956 Eisenhower had announced
his candidacy and Knowland had dropped his nomination bid.
Knowland was not a political neophyte and clearly understood the
ramifications of working with dissident Republican groups
throughout the nation. Though some of these individuals might
have political tact and savvy, the chances of this motley crew overseeing a successful general election campaign were very slight.
Knowland told an associate early on in the process that he was prepared to accept outlying support to get his name on the ballot in a
number of states, including Florida, but "planned to do everything
in [his] power once the election and nomination is settled to unite
the party and to make full use of the official ~ r ~ a n i z a t i o n s . " ~ ~
Knowland was not at all interested in the Garrisons or their continual campaign for control of the Republican apparatus and abandoned them as quickly as he had asked them for help.
This rejection, however, did not stop the Garrisons. Joe Miller,
an associate of the couple, began a fund-raising drive that capitalized
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45. William F. Knowland, Letter to William LaVarre, 13 February 1956, Copy in
Folder (Florida), Box 96, William F. Knowland Papers, Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley, California. [Hereafter cited as Knowland
Papers.]
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on Knowland's name recognition and promised success far beyond
1956. In a letter to notoriously right-wing oil tycoon H.R Cullen,
Miller hked for financial support to get Ike-First-Knowland delegates
on the ballot and help bolster the two-party system in the South. The
letter implied that this quest would not end with Knowland, so it
appears that the Garrison group was using Knowland's long shot candidacy as a pretext for filling the coffers of their own organization.
Cullen forwarded the letter to Knowland pledging to fulfill this
unorthodox request if Knowland wanted. Knowland advised Cullen
not to help, saying "I believe that those sponsoring this program in
Florida should handle their own problem and not solicit outside
assistance. They called you without my knowledge or approval."*
The Garrisons, however, continued to invoke Knowland's name in
their unsuccessful efforts to get Florence Garrison elected to the
RNC and to break the control of the rural northern counties over the
state party. One especially inflammatory circular, titled "PatriotsBeware!" explicitly linked Knowland with the Garrison's tireless battle for open primary election^.^'
Even while claiming to have Knowland's support, the racial
undertones of the Garrisons' political activity continued to undercut their chances for success among Florida Republicans. William
LaVarre, a Republican from Nokomis, Florida, with personal ties
to Knowland assessed Garrison's importance as minimal, telling
Knowland that he "controls mainly the Negro vote of Dade and the
surrounding counties."48In February 1956 an observer from St.
Petersburg wrote to Knowland urging him to disavow all ties with
the Garrisons. In their estimation, the 1955 Lincoln Day incident
still weighed heavily on people's minds, with Wesley Garrison
blamed for violating the racial status quo when he "tried to force
an integrated crowd in a hotel where Negroes are not allowed."
The writer went on to add further evidence that "it is reliably
reported that his wife is Jewish which hurts like everything in most
parts of the State. These factors may be a distinct disadvantage."49
46. H.R. Cullen, Letter to William F. Knowland, 8 March 1956, Copy in Folder
(Florida), Box 96, Knowland Papers; William F. Knowland, Letter to H.R.
Cullen, 14 March 1956, Copy in Folder (Florida), Box 96, Knowland Papers.
4'7. Charles Batchelder, Memo to Paul Manolis, undated, Copy in Folder
(Florida), Box 96, Knowland Papers.
48. William LaVarre to William F. Knowland, 26 January 1956, Copy in Folder
(Florida),Box 96, Knowland Papers.
49. A.B. Whitford, Letter to William F. Knowland, 5 February 1956, Copy in
Folder (Florida), Box 96, Knowland Papers.
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Many conservatives, who likely conflated the Garrisons with the
Dewey faction because of the latter's support of the FEPC, also
urged Knowland to ignore Garrison. Marie Grarnm, who Florence
had ostracized from the FFRW shortly after its founding, wrote to
Knowland using the stationary of the far right group "For
America." She proclaimed that &liation with Garrison would hurt
Knowland's chances of carrying a majority of state delegates in
Florida, more than likely because of their openness to black

republican^.^^
Organizing the Republican Party in a bi-racial fashion in a conservative Southern state did not pay dividends, no matter how populous the southern counties were in comparison to the northern
ones. This fact was especially true in 1956, as racial tension stemming from the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision still was a
concern to many Florida Republicans and eroded some of
Eisenhower's support. A small business owner in Jacksonville who
had voted for Ike in 1952 refused to donate to the state GOP
because of the Brown decision and the overall pro-civil rights tone
of the Eisenhower administration. He went on to claim that the
Republicans were making the Constitution into a "scrap of paper,"
but noted that he might have to vote for Eisenhower because "i
looks like the Stevenson-Kefauver-Eleanor Roosevelt-Walter
Reuther team would be worse rather than better, I am still hoping
for a Democratic Congress so that we can have some champion for
protecting the Con~titution."~~
The heightened racial awareness in
the aftermath of Brown did the Garrisons no favors.
The Knowland campaign was the last ditch effort of the
Garrisons to take over the Florida GOP. With its end the couple
faded into obscurity. Their role in the party was now so minimal
that they did not even factor in the national committeewoman's
post-election report to the RNC. 52 This is quite ironic, as during
the 1956 election cycle and beyond, the changes that the Garrisons
had tried to implement for the better part of two decades were

T#ull

50. Marie Gramm, Letter to William F. Knowland, 11 February 1956, Copy in
Folder (Florida),Box 96, Knowland Papers.
51. W.T.S. Montgomery, Letter to Earl Smith, 2'7 September 1956, Copy in Folder
(OF-109-A-2 1956 (3)), Box 496, Presidential Papers of Dwight D.
Eisenhower, Official File Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene,
Kansas. [Hereafter cited as Official File.]
52. Mrs. Frank E. Williams, Letter to Leonard Hall, 12 November 1956, Copy in
Folder (OF-109-A-2 1956 (4)) , Box 496, Official File.
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finally being realized. More than anything else this turn of events
makes the tale of Wesley and Florence Garrison a strange' one.
Here were local political leaders operating in the state's most populous county during a time of staggering inbound migration. They
challenged an organization that effectively disenfranchised the
majority of the state's Republican voters. When national
Republican leaders, including President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
made the two-party South a priority for their party-building goals
and finally tore the county-unit system down, the Garrisons were
nowhere to be found.
The tale of the Garrisons is indeed unusual because, despite
the overwhelming factors that favored their political goals, the
Garrisons were rejected, despised, and ostracized by local, state,
and national Republicans. The reasons for this are twofold and
inextricably linked. First, the Garrisons attempted to use their contacts with African-American voters, most notably in the Brownsville
section of town, as the cornerstone of their party-building efforts.
This prompted outrage among state Republicans, especially those
from the rural areas which dominated the state party. Second, the
Garrisons had virtually no political or social tact. At times, their letter writing campaigns and publicity-seeking maneuvers seemed to
border on the obsessive. While the couple sought a worthwhile
outcome while shamelessly promoting themselves as the solution,
their single-minded quest annoyed any and every operative that
they encountered. These two issues were conflated because their
critics often held their African American followers as evidence that
the Garrisons were simply power-hungrypeople who would do anything, even engaging in the extreme measure of violating
Southern racial mores, to realize their selfish ambitions. At times
the Garrisons' motives do appear less than altruistic, justifying
some amount of criticism, but racial undertones permeate the writings of their most strident detractors more than one would expect.
The leadership of the rural county bloc, which Cramer and the
Pinellas group ultimately supplanted in 1964, met its demise, just
as the Garrisons said it would. They were, however, on the wrong
side of the racial divide to bring about the change.
The Garrisons and their activities also highlight the interconnected nature of American politics. While Tip O'Neil has claimed
that all politics are local, state and national actors influence them
as well. For example, had Brownell thrown in with the Garrisons in
1947 the Miami faction would likely have kept Alexander and the
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WESLEY
AND FLORENCE
GARRISON
rural bloc from dominating state proceedings.
refused to run in 1956 and had Knowland gone
ination, the Garrisons might have retained so
party despite the hostility against them. Coun
are generally unproductive exercises, but her
major events of the period, including the
Brown v. Board of Education case, and Eisenh
the political possibilities for operatives in F1
above all else, illustrate how the dynamic p
impacted operatives, both inside and outsid
pected and unavoidable ways.
The strange tale of Wesley and Florence Garrison is also one
heavily affected by race and the exclusionary politics of the Solid
South. In a way, the Garrisons were ahead of their time. Their call
for ending both the county-unit system and the white-only composition of the Florida GOP began roughly a decade before the Civil
Rights Movement picked up in earnest and is reflective of their
northern roots. Though their real estate activities in Miami are
questionable, their mission to revitalize the Republican Party as a
bi-racial, truly democratic organization breaks the established
stereotypes of postwar blockbusters, many of whom engendered a
reactionary politics that contributed to the conservative shift in the
latter third of the 20" Century. The Garrisons seemingly cared for
their tenants and their clients and incorporated th
political process, making the couple either truly egali
opportunistic. The truth lies likely somewhere in be
their organizing, such as Florence's work in the Flo
of Republican Women, no doubt c~ntributed
strength of the party in Florida, but the inces
between the Garrisons and the Spades-Alexander
ly harmed the GOP. Though other Republicans
them, the Garrisons pushed the state party to
exclusionary, rural-based procedures. Whil
ambivalent, it seems clear that the Garrisons he1
racial status quo and played a critical role in the
Florida politics in the postwar period.
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